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For the Practitioner

BLUER
SKIES
IN
MARYLAND:
An Introduction To The New Maryland Exemptions For Limited And
Private Offerings of Securities
Mark A Sargent*
K Houston Matney* *

Introduction:
The Unpleasant Surprise
The general business practitioner is
often surprised to learn of the need to
comply with the securities laws. The surprise is often an unpleasant one, since it
usually arrives after a deal has fallen apart
and the investors have filed suit on the
basis of the registration or antifraud provisions of the federal and state securities
laws. That surprise may even become a
shock, if the practitioner learns that some
agency has invoked the criminal provisions of those acts against his client or
even against him.' The practitioner can
avoid such surprises by remembering that
some aspects of the state and federal
schemes of securities regulation are applicable in varying degrees to all securities transactions, and that these schemes
have supplanted the ancient maxim of
caveat emptor with its opposite-caveat
venditor.
Remembering that security regulation
may apply is especially important when
common sense suggests that the transaction has nothing to do with the secu-

rities laws. Common sense, for example,
might suggest that the securities laws
would not apply to a routine issuance of
stock in a closely-held, "mom and pop"
corporation. In this case, common sense
would be wrong. The antifraud provisions
of the securities laws apply to all securities transactions, including this one,2 and
mom and pop have the burden of proving
an exemption for this transaction from the
registration requirements. 3 That burden
may not be difficult to carry, but it remains
the responsibility of the persons selling
the securities, even if those persons are
mom and pop. Similarly, common sense
might suggest that the sale of condominiums, yachts, chinchillas, and orange
groves has nothing to do with the securities laws. Common sense might be wrong
in these cases, too, since the sale of these
commodities may be transformed into the
sale of "investment contracts" by the
manner in which they are sold. 4 Since
"investment contracts" are securities,S the
transaction would be subject to both the
registration and antifraud provisions.
The practitioner should also remember
that he has not exhausted his responsibilities by complying with the federal se-

curities laws. Every state, including Maryland, has its own securities act, or "blue
sky" law, and each state's act applies to
every securities transaction within the
state's borders. The practitioner must ensure compliance with the securities laws
of every state in which the client offers or
sells securities. This task is not simple:
the state securities laws are not mirror
images of either the federal securities laws
or each other, and the state securities
administrators are famous for their ingenious exercise of discretion.
Once the practitioner has alerted himself to the applicability of the securities
laws, he needs to think about which aspects of those laws apply to the transaction in question. He can start with one
simple premise: the antifraud provisions
apply to all securities transactions, regardless of whether the securities are
regis~"lred or exempt. In short, there are
no exemptions from the antifraud provisions; the securities must be offered and
sold without misrepresentation or omission of material fact. s The practitioner then
has to think about whether the persons
marketing the securities have complied
with the broker-dealer and agent regis-
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tration requirements, or whether they are
somehow exempted from compliance with
those requirements. Finally, the practioner has to determine whether the
transaction can be exempted from the securities registration requirements. This is
often the crucial determination, since the
costs of registration can be great, and a
security must be either registered or exempted before it can be offered to anyone. The offer or sale of an unregistered,
unexempted security is a plain and simple
violation of both federal and state law for
which the offender will be held strictly liable.
.
This article will not try to summarize the
vast range of issues surrounding securities law compliance. It will merely try to
explain the one aspect of the Maryland
securities laws that the general business
practitioner is likely to encounter on a routine basis-the transactional exemptions
for limited and private offerings of securities. This explanation should be timely,
because two rules recently promulgated
by the Maryland Division of Securities (the
Division) have altered the ways in which
these exemptions can be used and have
done so against the backdrop of dramatic
change in the federal exemptive provisions.? These new rules represent the
culmination of a long-term, intensive effort by the Division to foster capital formation by Maryland business (especially
small business), while continuing to meet
its obligation to protect Maryland investors.

Federal Exemptions and
Maryland Exemptions: The
Problem of Coordination
Before turning to the new Maryland exemptive rules, let's recall a key
premise: compliance with federal law must
be coordinated with state law compliance. This coordination can take one of
several forms. For example, a security
registered at the federal level may also
be registered in Maryland through· "registration by coordination."8 Similarly, some
transactions exempted at the federal level
may also be exempted from registration
in Maryland. We will see how the new
Maryland rules, in particular, enable such
pairing of federal and state exemptions.
On the other hand, a federally exempted
transaction may end up registered in
Maryland through the "registration by
qualification" procedure. 9 A transaction
exempted from federal registration because of its intra-state character,lO for example, may have to be registered by
qualification, unless an appropriate state
exemption can be found. Conversely,
some federally registered securities may
be exempt in Maryland. Any security of-

fered by issuers listed on the New York,
American or Philadelphia Exchanges, for
instance, will be automatically exempt in
Maryland, even if it is registered at the
federal level. 11
Let's assume that an issuer desiring to
offer and sell securities in Maryland has
a federal exemption. Let's also assume
that the exemption depends on the manner in which the security is being offered
and sold. In other words, the issuer has
a federal transactional exemption. That
transactional exemption, furthermore,
would probably be derived from § 3(b) of
the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act),
which exempts offerings limited in size,
or § 4(2) of the 1933 Act, which exempts
offerings private in character. 12
The issuer offering securities in Maryland, and using one or both of these federal exemptions, has a major threshold
decision. It can, of course, choose to register the securities in Maryland. This might
be a wise decision. The costs of Maryland
registration are not enormous, and state
registration may facilitate resale. Furthermore, the Division ordinarily reviews
the registration statement only for adequacy of disclosure, not for the substantive "fairness" or merits of the offering.
Alternatively, the issuer may look to §§ 11602(9) and (15) of the Maryland Securities Act. 13 Section 11-602(9), which sets
out the Maryland limited offering exemption, was amended in 1981 to reflect the
most important modern trends in exemption of limited offerings. Section 11-602( 15)
was enacted in 1981 to provide a statutory framework for coordination of federal
and state exemptions. These 1981 statutory changes marked the first step in the
Division's attempt to make Maryland's securities laws more responsive to the needs
of Maryland business.
The new Maryland exemptive rules
promulgated under §§ 11-602(9) and (15)
mark the second step in this effort. The
drafters of these rules were especially
concerned with increasing the issuer's
ability to coordinate these major federal
and state exemptions. In other words, the
drafters tried to define an exemptive
scheme which would function systematically with the federal exemptive scheme.
In so doing, the drafters gave effect to a
policy expressed by the drafters of the
Maryland Securities Act, 14 reflected in administrative practice and in Rule S-7 15 (the
predecessor to these new exemptions)
and made specific in § 11-602(15).
This policy of encouraging systematic
coordination of federal and state securities regulation has more than one purpose. First, it reflects a conviction about
the proper allocation of regulatory responsibilities in a federal system. Second, it reflects a desire to promote the
efficient operation of the securities mar-

kets. The new Maryland rules respond to
both of these concerns, but they also respond to another major concern-the
need to encourage capital formation by
small business. The following explanation will suggest several ways in which
the new rules can assist small businesses
in their capital raising efforts.

The Key To The System:
Maryland Regulation 15 and
"Exemption by Coordination"
As mentioned above, the 1933 Act provides two crucial exemptions from registration for limited and private offerings.
Section 3(b) is a deferral to the rule-making power of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the SEC); it permits that
agency to define by rule classes of transactions for which registration is not necessary because of the "small amount" of
securities being offered or the "limited
character" of the offering. Section 3(b)'s
only limit on the SEC's discretion is a
$5,000,000 cap on the aggregate offering
price of the securities so exempted. The
SEC has not hesitated to use its authority
under this section, promulgating important exemptive provisions such as Regulation A,16 which is still in effect, and
Rules 240 and 242, both of which have
been rescinded and replaced by Rules
504 and 505 of Regulation D.1?
Section 4(2) exempts "transactions by
an issuer not involving any public offering." In other words, § 4(2) exempts private offerings, or so-called "private placements." The exemption depends on the
private character of the offering rather than
its size, although the privacy requirement
has traditionally tended to limit the number of participating investors, if not the
aggregate offering price. The § 4(2) exemption also differs from the § 3(b) exemption in that it does not depend upon
the SEC's rule-making power. That is, a
"statutory" § 4(2) exemption exists apart
from the rules which the SEC has adopted
for the purpose of defining when an offering is public or private in character. The
rules promulgated by the SEC under § 4(2)
thus function only as "safe harbors." If
the issuer complies with the specific conditions of the rule, it has a § 4(2) exemption; if it fails to do so, it may still "stumble" into a statutory exemption by relying
on the case law and administrative utterances which have clustered around § 4(2)
over the years.18 The SEC's first § 4(2)
rule was Rule 146, now rescinded and
* Mr. Sargent is an Associate Professor of
Law at the University of Baltimore School
of Law.
** Mr. Matney is Commissioner, Division of
Securities, Office of the Maryland Attorney
General, and is a graduate of the University
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replaced by Rule 506 of Regulation D.
Regulation 0 represents a significant
reform of the SEC's exemptive rules. While
Regulation 0 is not necessarily simpler
than its predecessor rules, and while it
may not be of great help to very small
businesses,19 it is a great improvement
over its predecessors. Since the provisions of Regulation 0 have been summarized recently elsewhere,20 and since
the focus of this article is the new Maryland rules, only a few key points about
Regulation 0 need to be mentioned.
Regulation 0 consists of six separate
but interrelated rules. Rules 504-506 state
three distinct exemptions, two under § 3(b)
(Rules 504 and 505), and one under § 4(2)
(Rule 506). Rules 501-503 define terms
and conditions applicable to all three exemptions. This in itself represents an improvement, because Rules 240, 242 and
146, which were adopted at different times
and for different purposes, did not constitute a coherent, consistent system. The
systematic qualities of Regulation 0 are
not limited to the common set of definitions and conditions in Rules 501-503,
but are also expressed in the relations
among Rules 504-506.
To be precise: the three exemptions
impose regulatory restraints in proportion
to the amount of capital which can be
raised. Rule 504, for example, permits the
issuer to sell to an unlimited number of
purchasers, during a twelve-month period, securities with an aggregate offering
price of $500,000. These purchasers need
not meet "suitability" standards with respect to their investment sophistication or
economic risk-bearing ability. Furthermore, the exemption does not depend
upon the securities being offered and sold
through the use of a specific disclosure
document, and the issuer is permitted to
pay commissions to persons aiding the
sales effort. The major conditions of the
exemption are the relatively low dollar
ceiling and a requirement that notice of
sales be filed with the SEC.
Rule 505 raises the limit on the aggregate offering price to $5,000,000 in a
twelve-month period, and proportionately
increases the regulatory restraints. For
example, Rule 505 securities may be sold
to an unlimited number of accredited
investors, but to only thirty-five non-accredited investors. Accredited investors
are persons who meet certain objective
standards of suitability. "Accredited
Investor" is defined in Rule 501 (a) to include certain institutional investors, certain persons related to the issuer, persons purchasing a stated large amount
of securities, and persons meeting stated
net worth or annual income criteria. Since
accredited investors are deemed to be
suitable, the issuer may sell to an unlimited number of them. Since the non-ac-

credited investors, by definition, do not
meet Rule 501 (a)'s objective suitability
criteria, and since Rule 505 does not require the issuer to make individual, subjective judgments about their suitability,
the issuer may sell to only thirty-five of
them.
If the issuer sells to one non-accredited
investor, it must furnish a detailed disclosure document to every investor, both accredited and non-accredited, as a condition of the exemption. These conditions
are supplemented by a prohibition on
general solicitation and advertising, a notice filing requirement, and a denial of the
exemption to issuers which have themselves or through associated persons been
subject to specified judicial and administrative actions.
Rule 506 reflects the same kind of balancing. It places no cap on the aggregate
offering price and no restriction on the
types of issuers that can use the exemption. In addition, the issuer may sell to an
unlimited number of accredited investors
as well as to thirty-five non-accredited
investors. The issuer must be satisfied,
however, that each of those thirty-five nonaccredited investors meet certain generally specified standards of investment
sophistication. In addition, the sale to one
non-accredited investor triggers an obligation to deliver a detailed disclosure
document. If the aggregate offering price
exceeds $5,000,000 the issuer must deliver a more detailed disclosure document
than that required by Rule 505. These
conditions peculiar to Rule 506 are joined
by the restrictions on general solicitation
and advertising and by the notice filing
requirement.
One of the new Maryland rules was
specifically designed to exploit these reforms in federal law. Division of Securities
Regulation 15, subsection 8(1 )21 provides an exemption for an offer or sale
which "is part of an offering which is made
in compliance with Rule 505 or 506 ...
as such rules may be amended from time
to time." In short, a transaction which
complies with Rules 505 or 506 will be
eligible for exemption in Maryland, if it
meets the three simple conditions to this
exemption.
First, subsection 8(2) requires the issuer to file with the Division a manually
signed copy of the form filed with the SEC
in connection with the Regulation 0 offering (SEC Form D). This copy must be
filed within fifteen days after the first sale
of securities under Regulation 15.
Second, subsection 8(3) provides that
the issuer may pay sales remuneration
only to "a broker-dealer which the issuer
reasonably believes is registered" in
Maryland, or:
[aJ natural person who the issuer
reasonably believes has not re-

ceived a commission or similar remuneration for effecting any sale of
securities on behalf of more than one
other issuer within a 12-month period
immediately preceding the first sale
by that person in the offering made
in reliance on this exemption.
In other words, commissions or other remuneration may be paid only to a person
subject to licensing and regulation by the
Division, or to a person who is not engaged in the business of selling securities, but merely acts, on an occasional
basis, as an issuer's agent for the sale of
securities. This latter limitation reflects the
Division's long-standing position that a
person who represents more than two issuers in any twelve-month period is "engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of
others," and as such is a "broker-dealer"
under the Maryland Securities Act,22 An
issuer seeking the benefit of Regulation
15 should not be able to remunerate a
person who is selling securities in violation of the Act as an unregistered brokerdealer.23
Third, subsection 8(4) denies the exemption if the issuer, any of its directors,
officers, general partners, beneficial owners of ten percent or more of any class
of the issuer's equity securities, promoters currently connected with the issuer in any capacity, or non-registered
recipients of remuneration for sales efforts has been subject to specified judicial
or administrative actions within five years
prior to the first sale of securities under
this regulation. All of the specified actions
concern discipline for acts of a fraudulent
or deceitful nature. Note that these socalled "bad boy" disqualifications are additional to those already imposed on Rule
505 transactions by Rule 505(b)(2)(iii).
Regulation 15, therefore, permits a
substantial degree of exemption by coordination. It represents a positive effort
by the Division to use its authority under
§ 11-602(15) of the Maryland Securities
Act to adopt rules coordinating state exemptions with federal exemptions under
sections 3(b) and 4(2). Note, however,
that Regulation 15 does not permit Rule
504 transactions to be exempted by coordination. This distinction reflects the
SEC's intention of using Rule 504 as way
of deferring to state securities regulation. 24 That is, the SEC defined in Rule
504 a class of small offerings in which the
federal interest would be de minimis, provided that the state securities administrators would regulate those transactions.
Accordingly, a Rule 504 transaction must
either be registered by qualification in
Maryland or be exempt from registration
under another Maryland exemption, such
as that provided by new Division of Securities Regulation 9. 25
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The Rest of the System:
Maryland Regulation 9

with an examination of the General
Transactional Exemption (the GTE), since
that should be the most widely-used of
the two Regulation 9 exemptions.

Context
Regulation 15's exemption by coordination will be used for the great majority
of limited offerings and private placements, especially those made by larger
corporate issuers and by limited partnerships offering tax-sheltered investments,
since those transactions will typically be
exempted under Rule 505 and 506. We
have just seen, however, that Regulation
15 cannot be used with a Rule 504 exemption. Similarly, a transaction exempted under the § 4(2) statutory exemption, but not under the Rule 506 safe
harbor, cannot be exempted by coordination. This is a significant distinction:
many offerings by small businesses may
be genuinely private in character, but may
not qualify for a Rule 506 exemption because of a failure to comply with one of
the highly specific conditions of that Rule,
such as the notice filing requirement. Furthermore, a transaction exempted under
section 3(a)(11) of the 1933 Act because
of its intra-state character would not be
eligible for exemption by coordination. 26
This is also a significant distinction, because a small business may be very local
in character and may wish to take advantage of this exemption.
Since all transactions exempted under
Rule 504, § 4(2), or § 3(a)(11) should not
be subject to registration, the drafters of
the new Maryland rules attempted to devise an exemption which would provide
business, especially small business, with
a simple, practicable financing tool, while
still furnishing Maryland investors a substantial degree of investor protection.
Regulation 9 is the product of that effort.
Section 11-602(9), the statutory authority for Regulation 9, is similar to § 3(b)
of the 1933 Act, in that the exemption
depends entirely on the Commissioner's
exercise of his rule or order-making authority. There is no automatic "statutory"
§ 11-602(9) exemption; the exemption
may be obtained only through compliance with Regulation 9 or by order of the
Commissioner.
Regulation 9 has a structure similar to
that of Regulation O. Section A provides
definitions; section 8 defines conditions
applicable to all transactions to be exempted pursuant to Regulation 9; and
sections C and 0 set out the exemptions
themselves-the "Local Issuer" and
"General Transactional" exemptions.
Section E makes Regulation 9 inapplicable to federally registered transactions
and to transactions federally exempted
under Regulation A or Rules 505 and 506.
A functional analysis of how the regulation is intended to operate should begin

The General Transactional Exemption
The GTE exempts only specified securities issued by corporations, partnerships (both limited and general) and real
estate investment trusts (REITs). Subsection 0(1) limits the availability of the
exemption to certain issuers and certain
securities of those issuers in order to
withhold the exemption from so-called
"exotic" or unconventional securities in
the form of investment contracts, since
some of those securities have generated
significant investor protection problems.
The GTE is thus available as a matter of
course to conventional equity and debt
offerings by corporations, partnerships,
and REITs. Subsection 0(1) permits the
Securities Commissioner, however, to
extend the GTE by order "to other types
of securities and other types of issuers in
any case in which he determines that to
do so would not be inconsistent with the
public interest." Accordingly, the issuer of
a security not specifically included in subsection 0(1) may still be able to obtain
the exemption upon application to the
Commissioner.
The GTE does not directly restrict the
number or character of the persons to
whom securities can be offered and the
only indirect restriction on the number of
offerees results from subsection 8(3)'s
prohibition on general solicitation and advertising. The GTE does restrict, however, the number of purchasers. Subsection 0(2) provides that "[t)he issuer
shall reasonably believe that there are no
more than thirty-five purchasers, in this
State, of securities from the issuer in any
offering pursuant to this section." The
number "thirty-five" should not be read
literally, however, because subsection 8(6)
excludes from the calculation of that figure certain related persons of the issuer,
certain entities in which the issuer or its
related persons have more than a 50 percent beneficial interest, and accredited
investors.
The term "accredited investor" is defined in subsection A(1); the definition is
a liberalized version of Rule 501 (a) of
Regulation O. Accordingly, "accredited
investor" includes: certain institutional
investors; directors, executive officers, and
general partners of the issuer, together
with related persons of such persons;27
purchasers of at least $150,000 of the
securities being offered, if the payment is
made on certain specified terms and if
the purchaser meets certain net worth criteria; and purchasers with a net worth of
at least $1 ,000,000, or an annual income
of $200,000 in each of the two most re-

cent years.2B
Subsection 0(3) defines the issuer's
disclosure obligations under the GTE. If
the issuer sells only to accredited investors, no specific form of disclosure is
mandated as a condition of the exemption. In other words, failure to provide a
specific disclosure document will not result in loss of the GTE, although the antifraud laws will still require accurate disclosure of all material information.
Similarly, the GTE requires no specific
form of disclosure when the issuer sells
only to persons who meet certain investment sophistication criteria, or only to a
combination of accredited and sophisticated investors. Note that the concept of
investment sophistication plays only a very
limited role under Regulation 9. That is,
the sophistication of the investors may be
relevant to the form of disclosure, but the
exemption itself does not depend upon
offer and sale only to sophisticated investors. The old-fashioned "offeree suitability" concept has thus been abandoned.
Conversely, an issuer cannot obtain an
exemption simply by selling only to sophisticated investors. The other conditions must also be satisfied.
If the issuer sells to one non-accredited
or unsophisticated investor, it must provide a disclosure document to every
investor. If the issuer is a corporation, it
may use Form MO-2. Form MO-2 is a
simplified, fill-in-the-blank disclosure form.
While every issuer should rely on experienced counsel in completing Form MO2, the form is designed to help both the
seller and the buyer understand the information being disclosed. It represents
a major innovation and a departure from
a tradition of securities regulation which
mandates the production of repetitive, unreadable and unread disclosures. Only
time will tell whether the innovation is successful, but it is intended to make the
disclosure process more meaningful to
both the investor and the entrepreneur.
Form MO-2 requires specific information about: the securities being offered;
the use of the offering proceeds; the business of the issuer; the risk factors associated with the business; the organizational history of the issuer; the identity
and remuneration of persons selling the
securities; the identity and background of
the managers and owners of the issuer;
possible conflicts of interest; remuneration of management; recent distributions
by the issuer; recent securities issuances; the terms of payment for the securities being offered; the expiration date
of the offering; prior issuance of securities
to insiders at a price lower than the offering price; and the terms of any escrow
of the proceeds of the offering. In addition
to the foregoing, Item 19 of Form MO-2
requires the issuer, as a condition to the
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exemption, to provide various forms of
financial data. The amount and type of
financial disclosure varies with the length
of time the issuer has been in operation
and with the availability of certified financial statements.
As just mentioned, only corporations
may use Form MD-2. Limited partnerships and other issuers are, for now, required to fashion a disclosure document
which will provide equivalent information
in an appropriate form.29 These documents need not track Form MD-2's "fillin-the-blank" format. The Division plans
to publish a form for use by limited partnerships after a period of experimentation
with Form MD-2.
While the use of Form MD-2 or its
equivalent is unnecessary when the issuer sells only to accredited or sophisticated investors, another form of disclosure to such investors is required
whenever the issuer has previously issued "cheap stock" (stock sold at a price
substantially lower than the offering price)
to the insiders or does not intend to escrow the entire proceeds of the offering.
In essence, the issuer is required to specifically disclose to all investors the existence of such cheap stock or the lack
of escrow. Part II of Form MD-2 can be
used for that purpose. Subsection
D(2)(b)(i) defines when issuance of securities to insiders at a lower price triggers this disclosure requirement. These
special disclosure requirements reflect the
risks to investors which sometimes arise
when the proceeds of the offering can be
used before the offering is completed, and
when the insiders have paid less for their
equity position than the outside investors.
In addition to complying with subsection D(3)'s disclosure requirements, the
issuer will have to make a simple notice
filing with the Division of Securities on
Form MD-1 if the aggregate offering price
of the securities exceeds $100,000. This
$100,000 limit thus applies to the amount
of securities offered, not the amount actually sold. Subsection 8(7) requires this
filing to be made no more than fifteen
days after the first sale of securities pursuant to the GTE.
The issuer must also exercise reasonable care to ensure that the purchasers
of securities offered under the GTE are
purchasing for investment and not with a
view to distribution of the securities. Subsection 8(5) lists several steps which the
issuer can take to meet this duty of care,
including placement of a restrictive legend on the certificate or other document
evidencing the securities. A suggested
form of legend is set out in that subsection; it states that the securities have been
issued pursuant to a claim of exemption
from the federal and state securities laws,
and that they cannot be resold without

registration or another exemption.
The issuer must also be wary of the
"integration" requirement, i.e., it must be
sure that all of the sales which are part
of the GTE offering meet all the conditions of the exemption (subsection 8(2».
Finally, the issuer must reasonably believe that the persons remunerated for
selling the securities meet the criteria of
subsection 8(4). These are the same criteria specified in Regulation 15 8(3).
Even if the issuer fulfills all of the foregoing conditions, however, it will be disqualified from the exemption if it or certain
associated persons have been subject to
certain specified judicial and administrative action. The "bad boy" provisions
specified in subsection 8(9) are identical
to those set out in Regulation 15 8(4).

The Local Issuer Exemption
While the GTE should prove to be a
flexible financing device, the drafters of
Regulation 9 wanted to ensure that an
even more flexible device would be available to very small businesses-to "mom
and pop". This kind of flexibility is especially important because § 11-602(9), as
noted above, does not offer a separate
statutory exemption on which the issuer
could rely apart from the rule.
The "Local Issuer Exemption" (the
"LIE") thus allows some small, local corporations to issue a limited amount of securities to a limited number of investors
with minimal regulatory interference. Under
section C of Regulation 9, the LIE is available to corporations which: (1) are either
incorporated or qualified to do business
in Maryland; (2) have their principal place
of business in Maryland; and (3) have
fewer than fifty beneficial owners. Such
"local issuers" may sell up to $100,000
of securities to no more than ten purchasers within a twelve-month period.
Excluded from the calculation of the ten
purchasers are the persons specified in
subsection 8(6). The local issuer can use
the LIE, moreover, without filing any kind
of notice with the Division, and no specific
form of disclosure is required as a condition of the exemption. The antifraud laws,
of course, will require accurate disclosure
of all material information, but the exemption does not depend on that disclosure.
The only other conditions are those
general ones imposed by section 8: the
general advertising and solicitation prohibitions, the remuneration restrictions,
the "bad boy" disqualifications, and the
resale restrictions. The integration requirement also applies to the LIE as well
as the GTE.
The LIE offers a very simple exemption
for small businesses trying to raise a limited amount of capital. The array of exemptions offered by the LIE, the GTE,

and Regulation 15 should thus meet the
financing needs of most Maryland issuers. The terms of these exemptions,
however, are highly specific, and the possibility of unintentional non-compliance
arises. Subsection 8(1 )(b) of Regulation
9, therefore, provides that an issuer that
fails to meet all the conditions of either
the LIE or the GTE may apply for an exempting order from the Securities Commissioner. The Commissioner may grant
that order under subsection 8(1 )(b) if he
finds that "the transaction demonstrates
substantial compliance in good faith with
the conditions of the regulation" and that
"the order would not be inconsistent with
the public interest."

Some Cautionary Notes
1. While this brief article may be of some
help to the general business practitioner,
it is no substitute for a careful examination of the rules themselves, since many
crucial nuances must be omitted from an
introductory survey.
2. Although an issuer using the GTE
or the LIE will not always have to provide
the investors with a Form MD-2 as a condition of the exemption, it should find use
of the form helpful as a way of complying
with the antifraud requirements. While use
of the form does not in itself guarantee
freedom from suit, its use may help the
issuer avoid such litigation. The Division
thus hopes that the availability of this clear
and practical form will generate greater
compliance with Maryland's securities
laws.
3. The practitioner should accustom
small business clients to planning securities law compliance before commencement of their capital-raising efforts. A belated attempt to comply runs a greater
risk of failure, and failure may mean substantialliability as well as the death of the
deal.
Footnotes
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6 The practitioner should also remember that
"fraud" under the securities laws encompasses a broader range of activities than
does common law fraud.
7 The authors were members of the joint Maryland State Bar Association-Division of Securities committee that drafted the rules discussed in this article.
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8 MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-503
(1975).
9 MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-504
(1975).
10 By virtue of Securities Act of 1933, § 3(a)(11),
15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1981).
11 MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-601 (8)
(Supp.1982).
12 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(b) and 77d(2) (1981).
13 MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 11602(9),11-602(15) (Supp. 1982). These key
provisions are currently printed in the "pocket
part" to this volume of the Code.
14 See Report of the Committee to Study the
Administration of the Blue Sky Law of Maryland 5, 6 (October 11, 1961).
15 MD. ADMIN. CODE (CO MAR) § 02.02.03.07
(rescinded 1983). Note that the designation
"Rule S-7" reflects the numbering system
for state regulations which was in effect when
the rule was promulgated. The authors use
the designation here solely because of its
familiarity to the Bar.
16 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.252-.263 (1982).
1717 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.506 (1982).
18 A "statutory" exemption under section 4(2)
may not be easy to obtain. The pertinent law
is scanty, and it does not suggest that section 4(2) allows the issuer to sell to large
numbers of investors without registration.
See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346
U.S. 119 (1953); and Doran v. Petroleum
Corp., 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977).
19 See generally Kripke, Has the SEC taken
All the Dead Wood Out of its Disclosure
System?, 39 Bus. LAW. 833 (1983).
20 See, e.g., Sachs & Altman, Raising Capital
for Small Businesses by the Private Sale of
Securities- The New Federal and Maryland Rules, MD. B.J., June 1982, at 4.
21 MD. ADMIN. CODE (COMAR) § 02.02.03.15
B(1) (1983).
22 See MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11101(c)(1) (1975); and Md. Securities Release No. 18 (May 10, 1974), 1A BLUE SKY
L. REP. [CCH] ~ 30,560.
23 Note that state securities law interprets the
terms "commission" and "remuneration" very
broadly. See, e.g., Prince v. Heritage Oil
Co., 311 N.W. 2d 741 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
24 See SEC Rel. No. 33-6339 (Aug. 7,1981).
25 MD. ADMIN. CODE (COMAR) § 02.02.03.09
(1983).
26 A "safe harbor" for the section 3(a)(11) exemption is 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1982).
27 Compare, Rule 501 (a)(4) (Related persons
of the issuer's principals are not accredited
investors).
28 Compare, Rule 501 (a)(7) (The spouse's income may not be counted for purposes of
calculating income).
29 The Division recommends that real estate
limited partnerships use SEC Industry Guide
5 as a basis for the disclosure document.
See 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. [CCH] ~ 3829.

I plan on living a long and healthy life, so I
get regular cancer checkups. You should
too. Contact your local ACS office for a free
pamphlet on our new cancer checkup
guideline. Because if you're like me,
you want to live long enough to do it all.
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